Had a few hours of housework yesterday, thought I’d catch up on CommonCog, and so I did the whole exercise. 3 cases, voice memos, listen to Cedric’s reaction, another voice memo. Also inadvertently listened to the other Estee Lauder case, not having realized there were multiple.
Cedric’s reactions were very interesting, especially because they often pulled in things that were not written about in the case. When I took MBA classes, I noticed that the resolutions to case studies often involved things that were left out of the case, and it’s part of what led me to start calling MBA classes “LARPing.” Here though, they served merely as enrichment; plus, there had never been a claim that all the answers to an assignment would be in a case, especially as these cases are relatively short. They also mentioned a lot of things I had totally missed, such as the Ample Hills personal guaranteed loans and ensuing personal bankruptcy.
My initial reaction to the Ample Hills study was focused on the things dwelt on in the case study: lack of proper sales forecasting, operational difficulties. And then I got smacked in the face with “It was their cashflow and especially their interest payments – operational problems are fixable and just invite investment” where the interest payments were barely mentioned. When I’d heard all but one location were positive EBIT but the business wasn’t, I had not been thinking of interest paymetns.
And that primed me to think about the next two case studies from a cash flow basis, and perhaps seeing things that aren’t there.
There’s an Amazon review I really hate of Ben Horowitz’s “The Hard Thing About Hard Things,” one of my favorite books. The reviewer says “So all your revenue is from one product and one customer – diversify! Why can’t this silly CEO see a business lesson that’s obvious to me, a teacher turned forklift driver.” As if saying one word can magically conjure up a second product line when the first is struggling.
Reading these case studies, I found myself imagining solutions that I fear someone else could classify in the same category. Okay, so they wanted the Disney location which necessitated they build a factory which necessitated they open a lot more locations. Okay, well…couldn’t they just have a smaller offsite production space instead, or like a random kitchen somewhere in Orlando? The food distributor had major expenses maintaining their warehouse during COVID…couldn’t they just turn off all the lights and AC, or start leasing it for use as a field hospital, or maybe if they’d had a plan for a sudden 2x revenue drop it would have been enough to survive the 10x revenue drop and maybe it would have told them to get two adjacent warehouses instead of one so they could scale down easier. And maybe Estee Lauder could have done a smaller launch with fewer computers, or done better testing to find PMF and proper marketing – and why would “only $900k after Christmas” mean “almost bankrupt” anyhow?
But I don’t know to what extent any of those were real options. Hearing Cedric’s take on the food distributor – that it’s not clear they made any mistakes but still died – was a sobering smack of a business lesson which is obvious in the abstract yet hard to internalize.
(As an aside: I disagree with the idea that no-one could have seen COVID-19 coming. The timing was unknown, yes. But Contagion came out a decade before, and I distinctly remember listening to Homo Deus near the start of COVID and getting to the section where he said “Based on current trends, the risk keeps increasing of a zoonotic virus causing a global pandemic and societal shutdowns.”)
I must say though: the most important thing I noticed on second listen of the cases was the reference to my hometown in the Ample Hills case. The “Ooey Gooey Butter Cake” flavor is almost certainly based on Gooey Butter Cake, a St. Louis specialty.