Wow, very perceptive. What made you ask?
I had to cut this way short, because writing about ZIRP compellingly took up all my word count. But I wanted to add:
Getting Lucky Once
It’s possible to get one exit, by building the right thing and being at the right place at the right time. After which you can hang out on social media and opine on all things business and folks will think that you’re good at business but actually you’re not, not really. Rob Walling has talked about this, wrt to the bootstrapped software space he hangs out in.
Also, Naval falls into this category. (Exercise left for the alert reader — but anyway it doesn’t matter, he’s rich and happy and that’s what you want to be; just be careful who you get advice from, and for what game you’re playing).
Flipping Businesses as Opposed to Running a Business Forever
One thing I deeply enjoy about David Senra’s Founders is that he focuses on founders who run their businesses forever. (I don’t listen to Founders often because it’s like drinking Red Bull — which I also enjoy, but don’t drink, uhh, often.) Anyway Senra’s podcast is actually at odds with a strong subculture of Silicon Valley, which is “I just need to build a thing and ride the current wave and flip it at the first sign to get mine”, so I appreciate that he exerts a strong cultural force on it.
But flipping a business is still a valid way to play the game! Here’s Warren Buffett, in his original partnership letters:
You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the “Bigger Fool Theory”) is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results.
And here’s Roger Martin, commenting on Dollar Shave Club in an essay on 7 Powers:
in my experience, it is only a short period of grace until the competitor responds, in the vast majority cases. For example, Dollar Shave Club (DSC) had Counter-Positioning going for it against dominant incumbent Gillette — which would have been excoriated by its retail distribution channel if it had led or even very quickly followed with a direct-to-consumer shave club concept. But DSC’s market share success gave Gillette the legitimate excuse to launch Gillette Shave Club, which helped ensure that DSC would never earn a profit. But as the expression goes, for any turkey business there is a turkey buyer and Unilever paid $1billion for this ‘promising’ direct-to-consumer business. After seven years of razor-thin margins, Unilever sold DSC to private equity for an ‘undisclosed’ (i.e., minimal) price.
Of course, that isn’t to say that Buffett is above flipping a dud to an unwise buyer (“Rule No. 1: Never lose money. Rule No. 2: Never forget Rule No. 1”) or that DSC wasn’t a good outcome for its founders and investors … but the sentiment is understandable, and the possibility of such things happening is part of the shape of the game we play.
There’s also the idea that operational excellence might not matter in business except during downturns (or in specific business situations) … but I’ve already covered that at the end of my Deming essay. Anyway I have to go now to do more baby chores — what made you ask?